Emotet infection with Cobalt Strike

Published: 2022-07-07
Last Updated: 2022-07-07 22:47:35 UTC
by Brad Duncan (Version: 1)
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Introduction

Although I haven't been posting examples lately, Emotet has remained active since I last wrote an ISC diary about it in February 2022.  Today on Thursday 2022-07-07, I have a new example of an Emotet infection with Cobalt Strike to share.


Shown above:  Flow chart from today's Emotet activity on Thursday 2022-07-07.

Images from the infection


Shown above:  Desktop from the Windows host in my lab used for today's Emotet infection.


Shown above:  Email client I had populated with messages before today's infection.  The last four messages with attachments are Emotet malspam based on a previous Emotet infection.


Shown above:  Emotet malspam used for today's infection.


Shown above:  Malicious Excel spreadsheet used for today's infection.


Shown above:  Traffic from the infection filtered in Wireshark (1 of 2).


Shown above:  Traffic from the infection filtered in Wireshark (2 of 2).


Shown above:  Process Hacker showing processes for both Emotet and Cobalt Strike.


Shown above:  Registry update and location of persistent Emotet directory with Cobalt Strike.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Malware from an infected Windows host:

SHA256 hash: 25d4b42c98e6fb6ea5f91393252a446e0141074765e955b3e561d8b56454a73a

  • File size: 97,280 bytes
  • File name: INVOICE0004010160.xls
  • File description: Excel spreadsheet with macros for Emotet

SHA256 hash: 1e8d9f532c2c5909ba3a8ec8d05fc8bed667dcc0c2592224827b614af7fa3ce1

  • File size: 346,112 bytes
  • File location: hxxps://www.yell[.]ge/nav_logo/cvLMav68/
  • File location: C:\Users\[username]\soci1.ocx
  • File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\QjPIBTDyAjEJA\AMtPK.dll
  • File description: 64-bit DLL for Emotet
  • Run method: regsvr32.exe [filename]

SHA256 hash: aa4b22bf31692e70b63dfa0c93888e1795c2d861550f6926c720c3609df4c39a

  • File size: 346,112 bytes
  • File location: hxxp://airhobi[.]com/system/4Z6puOENN1DH2HYMzKLz/
  • File location: C:\Users\[username]\soci2.ocx
  • File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\WuaJyi\NPpaqh.dll
  • File description: 64-bit DLL for Emotet
  • Run method: regsvr32.exe [filename]

SHA256 hash: 2c7e18f64c2f229d03afc9b6231f950c0489b684ec0792e75baceb4a03833ff3

  • File size: 304,128 bytes
  • File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\WuaJyi\zqjwHhWLy.dll
  • File description: Updated 64-bit Emotet DLL persistent on the infected Windows host
  • Run method: regsvr32.exe [filename]

SHA256 hash: 6b4808050c2a6b80fc9945acdecec07a843436ea707f63555f6557057834333e

  • File size: 2,426,368 bytes
  • File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\WuaJyi\XAcCGhgSRbRFvGp.exe
  • File description: 64-bit EXE for Cobalt Strike sent to Emotet-infected host

Infection traffic:

URLs generated by Excel macros for Emotet DLL files:

  • 91.239.206[.]239 port 443 - hxxps://www.yell[.]ge/nav_logo/cvLMav68/
  • 193.53.245[.]52 port 80 - airhobi[.]com - GET /system/4Z6puOENN1DH2HYMzKLz/
  • 178.255.41[.]17 port 80 - zspwolawiazowa[.]pl - GET /images/Qb86rcUXgBHhg/
  • 112.78.112[.]34 port 80 - yudaisuzuki[.]jp - GET /150911pre/nsA8XrN93S/

Note: The first two returned DLL files, but the second two did not

Emotet C2 traffic:

  • 164.90.222[.]65 port 443 - HTTPS traffic
  • 144.202.108[.]116 port 8080 - HTTPS traffic
  • 138.197.68[.]35 port 8080 - HTTPS traffic
  • 34.80.191[.]247 port 7080 - HTTPS traffic
  • 201.73.143[.]120 port 8080 - HTTPS traffic
  • 146.59.151[.]250 port 443 - HTTPS traffic
  • 162.243.103[.]246 port 8080 - HTTPS traffic

Cobalt Strike traffic:

  • 52.18.235[.]51 port 443 - distinctive-obi-mgw.aws-euw1.cloud-ara.tyk[.]io - HTTPS traffic

Cobalt Strike URLs:

  • distinctive-obi-mgw.aws-euw1.cloud-ara.tyk[.]io - GET /api/v2/login
  • distinctive-obi-mgw.aws-euw1.cloud-ara.tyk[.]io - POST /api/v2/status?__cfduid=[19 characters, base64 string]

Final words

While Emotet might not get much high-profile press lately, it remains a continuing presence in our threat landscape.  A packet capture (pcap) of today's infection traffic with the email and associated malware samples can be found here.

Brad Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net

0 comment(s)
ISC Stormcast For Thursday, July 7th, 2022 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=8078

Comments

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