A few updates on "The Moon" worm

Published: 2014-03-25
Last Updated: 2014-03-25 16:51:32 UTC
by Johannes Ullrich (Version: 1)
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It has been over a month since we saw the "Moon" worm first exploiting various Linksys routers [1]. I think it is time for a quick update to summarize some of the things we learned since then:

Much of what we found so far comes thanks to the malware analysis done by Bernado Rodriges [2]. Bernado used QEMU to run the code in a virtual environment. QEMU is as far as I know the only widely available virtualization technique that can simulate a MIPS CPU while running on an x86 host. So far, most of what I have been doing relied on telnetting to an infected router. With QEMU, Bernado got additional insight into what happened with the worm. In particular, it is now easy to dump physical memory. The worm ran on OpenWRT. I am not sure if it would be possible to install the stock Linksys firmware in QEMU. Something on my list of things to try out. I think for future reverse analysis, this would provide a more realistic target. 

Infected systems will run an additional https server on a random port. The communication we observed in earlier posts is just https, using a self signed certificate. The server also provides statistics pages with summaries listing infected systems. For a screenshot, see https://twitter.com/daavidhentunen/status/441551682443300866/photo/1 .

At this point, I do still see regular hits from infected routers to my honeypot. They appear to have slowed down a bit, but I still get a number of scans a day.

[1] https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Linksys+Worm+TheMoon+Summary+What+we+know+so+far/17633
[2] http://w00tsec.blogspot.com

------
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
SANS Technology Institute
Twitter

Keywords: linksys moon
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ISC StormCast for Tuesday, March 25th 2014 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=3905

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